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Abstract
Machine learning models with very low test error have been shown to be consis-
tently vulnerable to small, adversarially chosen perturbations of the input. We
hypothesize that this counterintuitive behavior is a result of the high-dimensional
geometry of the data manifold, and explore this hypothesis on a simple high-
dimensional dataset. For this dataset we show a fundamental bound relating the
classification error rate to the average distance to the nearest misclassification,
which is independent of the model. We train different neural network architectures
on this dataset and show their error sets approach this theoretical bound. As a result
of the theory, the vulnerability of machine learning models to small adversarial
perturbations is a logical consequence of the amount of test error observed. We
hope that our theoretical analysis of this foundational synthetic case will point a
way forward to explore how the geometry of complex real-world data sets leads to
adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
Many standard image models exhibit a surprising phenomenon: most randomly chosen images from
the data distribution are correctly classified and yet are close to a visually similar nearby image
which is incorrectly classified [1, 2]. This is often referred to as the phenomenon of adversarial
examples. These adversarially found errors can be constructed to be surprisingly robust, invariant
to viewpoint, orientation and scale [3]. Despite some theoretical work and many proposed defense
strategies [4, 5, 6] the cause of this phenomenon is still poorly understood.
Various ideas have been proposed, but no consensus has been reached on an explanation. One common
hypothesis is that neural network classifiers are too linear in various regions of the input space, [1, 7].
Another hypothesis is that adversarial examples are off the data manifold [8, 9, 10, 11]. [4] argue that
large singular values of internal weight matrices may cause the classifier to be vulnerable to small
perturbations of the input.
These explanations assume the presence of adversarial examples stems from some sort of flaw in
model architecture or training procedure. Motivated by potential security concerns, many authors
have sought ways to defend against this phenomenon. Some works increase robustness to small
perturbations by changing the model architecture [12], distilling a large network into a small network
[6], using regularization [4], or detecting adversarial examples statistically [13, 14, 15, 16]. Many of
these methods, however, have been shown to fail [17, 18, 19]. A strong recent empirical result uses
adversarial training to increase robustness [5]. However, local errors have still been shown to appear
for distances just beyond what is adversarially trained for [20].
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In this paper we investigate a new potential explanation for adversarial examples, which may provide
insight into the difficulties faced by these defenses. We hypothesize that this behavior is due to
the high-dimensional geometry of data manifolds combined with the presence of low but non-zero
error rates. In order to begin to investigate this hypothesis, we define a simple but foundational task
of classifying between two concentric n-dimensional spheres. This allows us to study adversarial
examples in a simplified setting where the data distribution p(x) is well defined mathematically and
where we have an analytic characterization of the decision boundary learned by the model.
As we study this dataset we are interested in the relationship between two fundamental measures about
the error set E. First is the measure under the data distribution of the error set µ(E) = Px∼p[x ∈ E].
The second is the average distance to the nearest error d(E) = Ex∼pd(x,E) where d(x,E) denotes
the l2 distance from x to the nearest point in the error setE. The phenomenon of adversarial examples
can be stated as the surprising fact that for very accurate models (µ(E) is small), most points in the
data distribution are very close to an error (d(E) is also small). We consider the average distance
for simplicity. The quantity d(E) is related to “adversarial robustness” often studied in adversarial
defense papers, which estimates Px∼p[d(x,E) < ]1.
Our experiments and theoretical analysis of this dataset demonstrate that the quantities µ(E) and
d(E) can behave in counter-intuitive ways when the data manifold is high-dimensional. In particular
we show the following:
• Several models trained on this dataset are vulnerable to adversarial examples, that is most
randomly chosen points from the data distribution are correctly classified and yet are "close"
to an incorrectly classified input. This behavior occurs even when the test error rate is less
than 1 in 10 million and even when we restrict the adversarial search space to the data
manifold.
• For this dataset, we prove a fundamental upper bound on d(E) in terms of µ(E). In
particular, we prove that any model which misclassifies a small constant fraction of the data
manifold will be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations of size O(1/
√
n).
• Neural networks trained on this dataset approach this theoretical optimal bound. This
implies that in order to linearly increase d(E), the classification error rate µ(E) must
decrease significantly.
The upper bound we prove has implications for potential defenses against adversarial examples. In
particular, for this dataset, the only way to significantly increase adversarial robustness is to reduce
test error. We conclude with a discussion about whether or not a similar conclusions hold for other
datasets.
1.1 Related Work
The relationship between adversarial examples and high-dimensional geometry has also been explored
in some prior work. For example [21] show that, under a locally flat assumption of the decision
boundary, distance to the decision boundary is related to model generalization in the presence of
Gaussian noise added to the input. [22] prove that increasing adversarial robustness requires more
data. Our results are consistent with the theoretical results in [22], in particular we observe that given
enough data and a proper model class, it is possible to remove adversarial examples on this dataset.
Another impossibility theorem for a synthetic dataset was shown in [23]. This impossibility theo-
rem implies that any classifier on the considered dataset (even perfect classifiers) is vulnerable to
adversarial perturbations of a certain form. The goal of our work is to not exhibit a dataset which
is difficult to solve, but to instead understand the relationship between error rates and the presence
of adversarial examples. To our knowledge our work is the first to bound l2-robustness in terms of
out-of-sample error rates.
1In our experiments, we observed that the distribution of d(x,E) is tightly concentrated (Appendix A).
In such cases d(E) will approximate the largest  for which a model can exhibit significant l2 adversarial
robustness.
2
2 The Concentric Spheres Dataset
The data distribution consists of two concentric spheres in n dimensions: we generate a random
x ∈ Rn where ||x||2 is either 1.0 or R, with equal probability assigned to each norm (for this work
we choose R = 1.3). We associate with each x a label y such that y = 0 if ||x||2 = 1 and y = 1 if
||x||2 = R.
Studying a synthetic high-dimensional dataset has many advantages:
• The probability density of the data p(x) is well defined and is uniform over all x in the
support.
• We can also sample uniformly from p(x) by sampling z ∼ N(~0, I) and then setting
x = z/||z||2 or x = Rz/||z||2.
• We can design machine learning models which can provably learn a decision boundary
which perfectly separate the two spheres.
• We can control the difficulty of the problem by varying the input dimension n.
Our choice of R = 1.3 was arbitrary and we did not explore in detail the relationship between
adversarial examples and the distance between to two spheres. Additionally, our choice to restrict the
data distribution to be the shells of the two spheres was made to simplify the problem further.
We denote N to be the size of the training used. For some experiments we train in the online setting,
where each mini-batch is an iid sample from p(x) (that is N = ∞). All models were trained to
minimize the sigmoid cross-entropy loss L(θ, x, y) where θ denotes the model parameters.
2.1 Finding Adversarial Examples on the Data Manifold
Several recent works have hypothesized that adversarial examples are off the data manifold and
designed defenses based on this hypothesis [9, 10, 11]. In order to test this hypothesis on this dataset
we designed an attack which specifically produces adversarial examples on the data manifold which
we call the manifold attack.
Let (x, y) denote an example from the data distribution. To find adversarial examples xˆ on the data
manifold we maximize L(θ, xˆ, y) subject to the constraint ||xˆ||2 = ||x||2. This ensures that the
produced adversarial example is of the same class as the starting point and lies in the support of the
data distribution. We solve this constrained optimization problem by running 1000 steps of projected
gradient descent (PGD) with step size .01, only for the projection step we project back on the sphere
by normalizing ||xˆ||2. To find nearby adversarial examples we terminate PGD at the first error found.
Note that finding the nearest error is in general NP-hard [24], so we rely on this standard attack
technique in order to estimate d(E). Sometimes we are interested in worst-case examples, where we
iterate PGD for all 1000 steps, potentially walking very far along the sphere from the starting point x.
3 Adversarial Examples for a Deep ReLU Network
Our first experiment used an input dimensionality of n = 500. We then train a 2-hidden-layer ReLU
network with 1000 hidden units on this dataset. We applied batch normalization [25] to the two
hidden layers, but not to the readout layer. We train with mini-batch SGD, minimizing the sigmoid
cross entropy loss. We use the Adam optimizer [26] for 1 million training steps with mini-batch size
50 and learning rate 0.0001. Thus, over training 50 million unique data points were seen.
We evaluated the final model on 10 million uniform samples from each sphere — 20 million points
in total — and observed no errors. Thus the error rate of this model is unknown, we only have a
statistical upper bound on the error rate. Despite this, we are able to adversarially find errors on the
data manifold with the manifold attack.
In Figure 1 we investigate the decision boundary by visualizing different 2D subspaces of the 500
dimensional space. Note that the intersection of the two spheres on a 2D subspace will be two
concentric circles. When we take a random slice, we see the model has closely approximated the
max margin boundary on this slice. By contrast, when we take a 2D slice where one basis vector
is a worst-case adversarial example, the model’s decision boundary is highly warped along this
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Figure 1: Visualizing a 2D slice of the input space where the subspace is spanned by: 2 randomly
chosen directions (left), 1 random and 1 "adversarial direction" (center), and 2 orthogonal "adversarial
directions" (right). The data manifold is indicated in black and the max margin boundary in red. The
green area indicates points which are classified by the ReLU network as being on the inner sphere. In
the last plot, the slice of the entire outer sphere is misclassified despite the fact that the error rate of
the model is less than 1 in 10 million.
"adversarial direction". There are points of norm greater than 2 that the model confidently classifies
as being on the inner sphere. We can also take a slice where the x and y axis are an orthogonal basis
for the subspace spanned to two different worst-case examples. Although the last plot shows that the
entire slice of the outer sphere is misclassified, the volume of this error region is exceedingly small
due to the high-dimensional space.
Despite being extremely rare, these misclassifications appear close to randomly sampled points on
the sphere. We measured the mean l2 distance to the nearest error on the inner sphere to be 0.18.
This is significantly smaller than the distances between random samples from p(x). In particular,
when we sampled 10000 random points on the inner sphere, the nearest pair was distance 1.25 away
from each other.
This phenomenon only occurs in high-dimensions. We found that the same model trained on 100
samples with n = 2 makes no errors on the data manifold. We also explored the above training
procedure for n ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} and found that when n < 100 the attack
algorithm fails to find errors (this of course does not imply that no adversarial examples exists).
Additional details can be found in Appendix B.
4 Analytic Forms for a Simpler Network
It has been hypothesized that the existence of adversarial examples may be a result of some sort of
flaw in model architecture. For example, [12] hypothesized that changing the non-linearity of neural
networks may improve robustness and [6] tried increasing robustness by distilling a large neural
network into a smaller one2. To investigate the role of architecture we study a simpler model which
intuitively is better suited for this problem. The network, dubbed “the quadratic network,” is a single
hidden layer network where the pointwise non-linearity is a quadratic function, σ(x) = x2. There is
no bias in the hidden layer, and the output simply sums the hidden activations, multiplies by a scalar
and adds a bias. With hidden dimension h the network has n · h+ 2 learnable parameters. The logit
is written as
yˆ(x) = w~1T (W1x)
2 + b (1)
where W1 ∈ Rh×n, ~1 is a column vector of h 1’s. Finally, w and b < 0 are learned scalars. In
Appendix C, we show that the output of this network can be rewritten in the form
yˆ(x) =
d∑
i=1
αiz
2
i − 1 (2)
where αi are scalars which depend on the model’s parameters and the vector ~z is a rotation of the
input vector ~x. The decision boundary of the quadratic network is all inputs where
n∑
i=1
αiz
2
i = 1. It
2This method was later shown to not increase robustness [17].
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Figure 2: Left: The final distribution of αi when the quadratic network is trained on 106 examples. In
order for the model to have µ(E) = 0, all αi must lie between the two red lines. Despite an estimated
error rate of 10−11, 394 out of 500 of the αi are incorrect. This means the ellipsoid decision boundary
is badly warped along most axes. Right: Training curves of the quadratic network initialized at a
perfect initialization with no classification errors. As training progresses average loss gets minimized
at the cost of a dramatically worse worst-case loss. The number of incorrect αi increases at a similar
rate.
is an n-dimensional ellipsoid centered at the origin. This allows us to analytically determine when
the model has adversarial examples. In particular, if there is any αi > 1, then there are errors on the
inner sphere, and if there are any αi < 1/R2, then there are errors on the outer sphere. Therefore, the
model has perfect accuracy if and only if all αi ∈ [1/R2, 1].
When we train the quadratic network with h = 1000 using the same setup as in Section 3 we arrive
at the perfect solution: all of the αi ∈ [1/R2, 1] and there are no adversarial examples. If we instead
limit the size of the training set to N = 106 we arrive at a model which empirically has a very low
error rate — randomly sampling 10 million data points from each sphere results in no errors — but
for which there are adversarial examples. In fact, 325 out of 500 of the learned αi are incorrect in
that αi 6∈ [1/R2, 1] (for a complete histogram see Figure 2). This means that the ellipsoid decision
boundary is badly warped in many of the dimensions.
We can use the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) to estimate the error rate of the quadratic network from
the αi (Section 4.1). The estimated error rate of this particular model is ≈ 10−20.
Next we augmented the above setup with a “perfect” initialization; we initialize the quadratic network
at a point for which all of the αi are “correct” but there are non-zero gradients due to the sigmoid
cross-entropy loss. The network is initialized at a point where the sigmoid probability of y = 1 for
the inner sphere and outer spheres is .0016 and 0.9994 respectively. As shown in Figure 2 continued
training from this initialization results in a rapid divergence of the worst-case and average-case losses.
Although the average loss on the test set decreases with further training, the worst-case rapidly
increases and adversarial examples can once again be found after 1000 training steps. This behavior
results from the fact that the training objective (average sigmoid cross-entropy loss) does not directly
track the accuracy of the models.
4.1 Analytic Estimates of the Error Rate
In Appendix D, we show how to use the CLT to analytically estimate the accuracy for the quadratic
network in terms of the αi. In particular, let µ =
d∑
i=1
(αi− 1) and σ = 2
d∑
i=1
(αi− 1)2. Then the error
rate on the inner sphere can be estimated as
P~x∼S0
[
d∑
i=1
αix
2
i > 1
]
≈ 1− Φ
(µ
σ
)
. (3)
We consider the Gaussian approximation3 as it yields a simple, easy to understand formula, and
obtaining exact values is not necessary for the purposes of this section.
3Standard Chernoff bounds are also too loose for the models we consider.
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Equation 3 implies that there are many settings of αi which obtain very low but non-zero error rates.
As long as 1n
n∑
i=1
αi ≈ (1 + R−2)/2 and the variance is not too high, the model will be extremely
accurate. The histogram in Figure 2 illustrates this; i.e. the learned model has an estimated error
rate of 10−11 but 80% of the αi are incorrect. For a typical sample, the statistical model sums
“incorrect” numbers together and obtains the correct answer. Flexibility in choosing αi while
maintaining good accuracy increases dramatically with the input dimension. This principal may
carry over to image datasets, there may be many ways for a convolutional neural network to learn
correlations between input features and the output that result in impressive generalization but do not
involve a human level understanding of task at hand [27]. We discuss this further in Appendix E.
5 A Small Amount of Classification Error Implies Local Adversarial
Examples
The theoretical analysis of the quadratic network in Section 4.1 explains why µ(E) might be very
small but non-zero. In this section we prove a fundamental bound on the quantity d(E) in terms of
µ(E).
Let S0 be the sphere of radius 1 in n dimensions and fix E ⊆ S0 (we interpret E to be the set of
points on the inner sphere which are misclassified by some model). We prove the following theorem
in Appendix F:
Theorem 5.1 Consider any model trained on the sphere dataset. Let p ∈ [0.5, 1.0) denote the
accuracy of the model on the inner sphere, and let E denote the points on the inner sphere the model
misclassifies (so in measure µ(E) = 1 − p). Then d(E) ≤ O(Φ−1(p)/√n) where Φ−1(x) is the
inverse normal cdf function.
This theorem directly links the probability of an error on the test set to the average distance to the
nearest error independently of the model. Any model which misclassifies a small constant fraction of
the sphere must have errors close to most randomly sampled data points, no matter how the model
errors are distributed on the sphere. At a high level it follows as direct corollary of an isoperimetric
inequality of [28]. The error set E of fixed measure µ(E) which maximizes the average distance to
the nearest error d(E) is a "cap", which is a set of the form E = {x ∈ S0 : w · x > b} (the sphere
intersected with a halfspace). This is visualized for different dimensions in Figure 3. Even if one
were to optimally distribute the error set E of measure µ(E) in a local region near a pole of the
sphere, this region must extend all the way to the equator and d(E) would be small.
Theorem 5.1 gives an optimal bound on d(E) in terms of µ(E). In Figure 4, we can compare how
the error sets of actual trained neural networks compare with this optimal bound. We train three
different architectures on the sphere dataset when d = 500, the first is a "small" ReLU network with
1000 hidden units and 2 hidden layers (ReLU-h1000-d2), the second is the quadratic network with
1000 hidden units (Quad-h1000), and the third is a "large" ReLU network with 2000 hidden units and
depth 8 (ReLU-h2000-d8). We train these networks with varying number of samples from the data
distribution, in particular N ∈ {1000, 5000, 10000, 100000,∞}. For each architecture and training
set size N , a model is trained 4 unique times with independent initializations (this means that 60
independent models were trained in total). We then sample the performance of the networks several
times during training, computing both the error rate of the model and the average distance to nearest
error. The error rate is estimated from 106 random samples from the data distribution and the average
distance is estimated by 100 random points and running PGD for 1000 steps with step size of .001
(searching only on the data manifold for errors). Each point on the plot is a network at a certain
snapshot during training. When N ≥ 10000 the networks later in training become so accurate that
the error rate cannot be estimated statistically from 106 samples, these points do not appear in the
graph. We see that the measured d(E) is always close to what is theoretically optimal given the
observed µ(E). The optimal d(E) curve is shown in black and is calculated as Φ−1(1− µ(E))/√n.
We also plot in blue the same optimal curve as estimated by sampling 106 points on the sphere, and
calculating their average distance to an actual spherical cap (this is to verify that the estimate provided
by Theorem 5.1 is accurate). Note that there is some noise in estimating the error rates and average
distances (for example PGD is not guaranteed to find the closest error). As a result some networks
when sampled appear slightly better than optimal.
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Figure 3: We visualize Theorem 5.1 as the dimension of the inner sphere increases. In each plot
we visualize an error set of measure µ(E) = .01 (indicated in red) which achieves the theoretically
optimal average adversarial distance d(E). As the dimension increases the error set (which is a
spherical cap) extends all the way to the equator. This means that d(E) shrinks despite the fact that
µ(E) is held fixed. Note that the mass of an n-dimensional sphere is concentrated near the equator.
This allows the measure of the error set to be small despite being so close to the equator.
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Figure 4: We compare the average distance to nearest error with error rate for 3 networks trained
on the sphere dataset. All errors are reported for the inner sphere. The 3 networks are trained with
5 different training set sizes, and their performance are measured at various points during training
(the networks eventually become too accurate to appear on this graph, as the error rate will be too
small to estimate from a random sample. Surprisingly, our empirical measurements of d(E) for these
different models are all close to optimal given the measure of the error set µ(E). We plot the optimal
curve in two ways, first with empirical measurements of actual spherical caps (blue), and second with
the approximate bound given in Theorem 5.1 (black). Note that due to some noise in estimating the
error rates and average distances, some networks may appear slightly better than optimal.
This plot suggests that the decision boundaries of these networks are all well behaved given the amount
of test error observed. Interestingly, despite vastly different architectures the relationship between
µ(E) and d(E) is similar for all networks. This is evidence that the geometry of their decision
boundaries is similar. It is surprising that an 8-layer ReLU network with 29 million parameters would
exhibit a similar relationship between µ(E) and d(E) as the much simpler quadratic network.
6 Implications for Real World Datasets
For the idealized sphere data set, Theorem 5.1 has two key implications. First, in this setting, the only
way to reduce the frequency of adversarial examples is to reduce generalization error. Second, the
same isoperimetric inequality argument implies there is nothing “special” about adversarial examples
as a class. That is, for any model with reasonable accuracy, most errors are “adversarial” relative to
some example data point, in the sense that for a typical incorrectly classified point there is a small
perturbation that will cause it to be correctly classified. This means that there is no hope of finding
some identifying characteristic of an adversarial example that hints that it is the result of tampering
or a special construction.
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The natural question is whether these two conclusions apply to real-world data sets. While the sphere
data set is highly idealized, it is closely related to a standard Gaussian distribution of examples from a
given class. Indeed, it seems plausible that a similar theorem might hold for an anisotropic Gaussian
distribution with large variances on sufficiently many dimensions.
Early experiments suggest, however, that the relationship between generalization error and frequency
of adversarial examples may be more complicated for real world datasets. In the case of the MNIST
dataset, there is a gap between the d(E) observed by current state-of-the-art vision models, and
any impossibility theorem one could hope to prove that does not make any assumptions about the
model. In particular, in Appendix G we construct a hypothetical set E for MNIST which satisfies
µ(E) = .01 and d(E) = 6.59. This set is constructed by considering a halfspace aligned with a top
PCA direction. It does not correspond to the error set achieved by any machine learning model. By
comparison a vanilla convolutional neural network we trained satisfies µ(E) = .007 and d(E) = 1.3.
The existence of this gap is in agreement with recent empirical results using adversarial training
which has increased adversarial robustness without reducing test error [5]. This also demonstrates
that there is still room for increased adversarial robustness before out-of-sample error rates in the
natural image distribution must also be reduced.
On the other hand, there is some potential supporting evidence from experiments using state-of-
the-art computer vision models, which do not generalize perfectly in the presence of large, visually
perceptible Gaussian noise added to an image [1]. There may be a relationship between these
sampled test errors and imperceptible, adversarially-found errors. Indeed, recent work [21] has
provided evidence that there is a relationship between the distance to the decision boundary and
model generalization in the presence of large, visible noise added to the input.
Overall, we believe it would be interesting for future work to investigate these questions in more detail
for other data sets. If similar results hold for real world data sets, it would not imply that improving
adversarial robustness is impossible, only that doing so would require improved generalization.
7 Conclusion and Takeaways
In this work we hypothesized that the counter-intuitive behavior of adversarial examples could be a
naturally occurring result of the geometry of the high-dimensional manifold. To that end we studied
a simple dataset of classifying between two high-dimensional concentric spheres. After training
different neural network architectures on this dataset we observed a similar phenomenon to that of
image models — most random points in the data distribution are both correctly classified and are
close to a misclassified point. We then explained this phenomenon for this particular dataset by
proving a theoretical upper bound on the average distance to nearest error, d(E) in terms of test error
µ(E) which is independent of the model. We also observed that several different neural network
architectures closely match this theoretical bound.
Theorem 5.1 is significant because it reduces the question of why models are vulnerable to adversarial
examples to the question of why is there a small amount of classification error. This has implications
for the adversarial defense literature, as it implies the only way to defend against small perturbations
on this dataset is to significantly reduce µ(E).
Our results on this dataset provide a counterexample to many previously proposed hypothesis for the
existence of adversarial examples. This could explain why many prior adversarial defense proposals
based on other hypothesis have later been shown to fail [17, 18, 19]. We believe our results on this
simple dataset provide a useful starting point for future investigations into the nature of adversarial
examples, the “adversarial subspace”, or potential issues with model decision boundaries. Regarding
increasing adversarial robustness, there is reason to be optimistic. In the case of MNIST, we have
shown that there is room for further improvement of adversarial robustness given current out-of-
sample error rates. Furthermore, even if similar impossibility results do hold for other datasets, they
would not imply that defending against adversarial examples is impossible, only that success in doing
so would require improved model generalization.
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Appendix
A Inspecting the Distribution Over Distances
The primary metric considered throughout this work is the average adversarial distance d(E). This metric is
considered for simplicity, however we find that it is closely related to the concept of  l2-robustness typically
considered in the adversarial defense literature. Because the distances are tightly concentrated (Figure A.1),
we can interpret the mean distance to approximate to the largest  for which a network is 50% robust in the l2
metric.
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Figure B.2: Visualizing d(E) during the course of training. When n < 100 the models improve to a
point where the attack algorithm is no longer able to find errors (at which case no points are shown).
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Figure B.3: Left: Cross entropy loss for the ReLU network trained on the sphere with n = 500. Note
that the loss is estimated from out of sample data and thus the fact that it is so low (< 10−9) is not
the result of over-fitting. Right: d(E) during the course of training. Despite the fact that the loss is
so low, there are still errors in the data distribution, and the average distance plateaus around .18.
B Additional Results on Training
We ran the 2-hidden-layer ReLU network for various input dimensions and measured d(E) during training,
results are shown in Figure B.2. d(E) here is estimated from 100 random starting points on the sphere and
running 1000 steps of PGD with step size .01. If no errors are found from these 100 starting points then attack is
considered to have failed. When n < 100 the models reach a point where the attack algorithm no longer finds
errors, no data is plotted for these points. However, when n = 100 the observed d(E) plateaus around .7. For
n = 500, d(E) quickly plateaus at .18. Note that a failed attack does not imply that no errors exist. All models
quickly become so accurate that test error cannot be estimated statistically.
In Figure B.3 we plot the loss of the 2-layer ReLU network trained with n = 500. The cross-entropy loss (as
measured with out-of-sample data) becomes less than 10−9. The quantity d(E) plateaus around .17.
C The Decision Boundary of the Quadratic Network
Here we show the decision boundary of the quadratic network is a n-dimensional ellipsoid. We’ll use x to
denote the column vector representation of the input. The logit of the quadratic network is of the form
l(x) = (W1x)
T (W1x)w + b (4)
W1 is the input to hidden matrix, and w and b are scalars. We can greatly simplify this by taking SVD of
W1 = UΣV
T . So we have the following:
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l(x) = (W1x)
T (W1x)w + b
= (UΣV Tx)T (UΣV Tx)w + b
= (xTV ΣUTUΣV Tx)w + b
Let z = V Tx which is a rotation of the input. Then the above becomes
l(x) = zTΣ2zw + b (5)
Letting the singular values of W1 be the sequence (si) we have
l(x) = w
n∑
i=1
s2i z
2
i + b (6)
The decision boundary is of the form l(x) = 0, thus we have
w
n∑
i=1
s2i z
2
i + b = 0
n∑
i=1
αiz
2
i − 1 = 0
where αi = w ∗ s2i /(−b).
Note the distribution of z is the same as x (they are rotations of each other) so replacing zi with xi above yields
a rotation of the decision boundary.
D Estimating the Accuracy with the Central Limit Theorem
Here we show how to estimate the accuracy of the quadratic network with the CLT. Let {αi}ni=1 be nonnegative
real numbers and b > 0. Let S0 be the unit sphere in n-dimensions. Suppose z is chosen uniformly on S0. Then
we wish to compute the probability that
n∑
i=1
αiz
2
i > 1. (7)
One way to generate z uniformly on S0 is to pick ui ∼ N(0, 1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and let zi = ui/||u||. It follows
that we may rewrite eq. (7) as,
1
||u||2
n∑
i=1
αiu
2
i > 1
n∑
i=1
αiu
2
i >
n∑
i=1
u2i
n∑
i=1
(αi − 1)u2i > 0. (8)
Let X =
∑n
i=1(αi−1)u2i . In the case that n is sufficiently large we may use the central limit theorem conclude
that X ∼ N(µ, σ2). In this regime X will be determined exclusively by its first two moments. We can work out
each of these separately,
µ = E[X] =
n∑
i=1
(αi − 1) (9)
σ2 = Var[X] = 2
n∑
i=1
(αi − 1)2. (10)
It follows that,
P (X > 0) = P (σZ + µ > 0) = P
(
Z > −µ
σ
)
= 1− Φ
(
−µ
σ
)
(11)
which proves the result.
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Figure E.4: We consider a classification model which only sees a projection of the input, size n,
onto a k dimensional subspace. We then plot what k/n needs to be in order for the model to obtain
a certain error rate. When the input is high dimensional, a model can become extremely accurate
despite ignoring most of the input.
E A Model Can Be Extremely Accurate While Ignoring Most of the Input
Our theoretical analysis of the quadratic network demonstrated that there are many ways for the model to exhibit
impressive generalization while fundamentally “misunderstanding” the underlying task. That is for a typical
example, the quadratic network sums “incorrect” numbers together and obtains the correct answer.
To illustrate this further consider a special case of the quadratic network where the decision boundary is of the
form
k∑
i=1
x2i = b.
This simplified model has two parameters, k the number of dimensions the model looks at and b a threshold
separating the two classes. How large does k need to be in order for the model to obtain a desired error
rate? (Assuming b is chosen optimally based on k). We answer this question using the CLT approximation in
equation 11. In Figure E.4 we plot the fraction of input dimensions needed to obtain a desired accuracy using
this simplified model. For example, if n = 2000 then the model can obtain an estimated accuracy of 10−14
while ignoring 62% of the input. This behavior happens empirically when we train a quadratic network which is
too small to perfectly separate the two spheres. For example, the quadratic network with 1000 hidden nodes
trained with n = 2000 obtains an estimated generalization error of 10−21 and 10−9 on the inner and outer
spheres respectively despite being only 1/2 the size required to achieve 0 error. This suggests that the size of a
network required to achieve very low test error may be significantly smaller than the size of a network required
to achieve 0 test error.
F Proof of Theorem 5.1
In this section we sketch a proof of Theorem 5.1. Let E be the points on the inner sphere S0 which are
misclassified by some model. Let µ(E) denote the measure ofE and d(E) = Ex∼S0d(x,E) denote the average
distance from a random point on S0 to the nearest point in E.
A "cap" of S0 is the intersection of the sphere with a half space of Rn. Intuitively a cap is all points which are
located within some fixed distance of a pole. [28] prove that the set E of given measure µ(E) which maximizes
d(E) is a "cap". Thus, without loss of generality we may assume that E = {x ∈ S0 : x1 > α/√n} for some
α > 0. Obtaining the estimated optimal d(E) thus requires relating the measure of a spherical cap of height α
to the average distance from a random sample x ∼ p(x) to this cap. Computing this exactly requires solving
intractable iterated integrals, so instead we estimate this quantity using a Gaussian approximation. That is, as n
becomes large, the distribution of a single coordinate xi on the sphere approaches N(0, 1n ). We empirically
verify this approximation in Figure F.5. Thus we have
P[x ∈ E] ≈ P[N(0, 1
n
) > α/
√
n] = P[N(0, 1) > α].
Thus we have α = Φ−1(µ(E)), because this implies P[N(0, 1
n
) > α/
√
n] = µ(E).
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Figure G.6: Left: To understand how Theorem 5.1 for the sphere relates to MNIST we compare
the PCA explained variance ratios of the two datasets. The sphere is rotationally symmetric so all
directions share the same explained variance. MNIST, however, is highly stretched along a few
PCA directions. Center: We consider two different halfspace error sets which give vastly different
relationships between µ(E) and d(E). One way to maximize d(E) given a fixed µ(E) is to distribute
the errors in halfspaces aligned with the top PCA directions. The top PCA halfspace (red) has
measure µ(E) = .01 and d(E) = 6.5. The low variance PCA halfspace (orange) has small measure
in the data distribution (µ(E) = .0001) but also small average adversarial distance d(E) = .084.
For x ∈ S0 let d(x,E) denote the distance from x to the set E. This distance is equal to max(
√
2(α/
√
n−
x1), 0). Thus we have
d(E) = Ex∼S0d(x,E) ≈ E
[
max
(√
2(α/
√
n−N(0, 1
n
)), 0
)]
= O(Φ−1(µ(E))/
√
n).
We can empirically verify that the quantity Φ−1(µ(E))/
√
n closely approximates the d(E) from actual spherical
caps by sampling many points x randomly on the sphere and averaging d(x,E). This is done by sampling 106
points, and is used to plot the blue line in Figure 4 of the main text. The black line in the same plot is the function
Φ−1(µ(E))/
√
n, and closely matches these empirical estimates.
G Does a variant of Theorem 5.1 hold on MNIST?
The goal of this section is to better understand whether any variant of Theorem 5.1 holds for real world datasets.
This theorem is somewhat remarkable because it makes absolutely no assumption about the model decision
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boundary, other than there is test error µ(E). Thus it is simply a statement about the geometry of the data
manifold. Rigorously proving a similar statement for real world datasets may be extremely difficult without a
mathematical characterization of the data generating process p(x). Nonetheless we can interpret the MNIST
dataset as a finite iid sample from some theoretical distribution over images p(x) and construct a set E ⊆ Rn
which satisfies µ(E) is small but d(E) is large. Note that simply choosing E = {x1, . . . , xk} for 1% of the test
samples would not work here, because we should assume that the measure µ({xi}) for any single image to be
exceedingly small. Instead we inspect the training set and construct a set E ⊂ R784 for which 1% of the training
set lies in E, and for which d(E) is large. Then we can interpret the test set as a fresh iid sample from p(x)
and estimate µ(E) and d(E) from this sample. Using this approach we construct a set E ⊂ R784 for which
µ(E) = .01 and d(E) = 6.59, this set can be thought of as a lower bound on any variant of Theorem 5.1 one
could hope to prove. For example, our construction shows that there is no theorem of the form “every subset
E ⊆ R784 with µ(E) = .01 satisfies d(E) < 6.59”. However, one could imagine making some assumptions
about E, given that it needs to arise naturally from the decision boundary of a machine learning model, and
showing a stronger bound. This would be interesting future work.
To construct such anE we consider all possible halfspaces ofR784 and choose the one which satisfies µ(E) = .01
and maximizes d(E). Considering halfspaces is natural, in particular the sets of maximal d(E) for the sphere
dataset are all halfspaces intersected with the data manifold. Recall that a halfspace of Rn is a set of the form
Ew,b = {x ∈ Rn : w · x > b}, where the vector w is the normal vector of a halfspace. For any x ∈ Rn the
distance from x to the nearest point in this space, d(x,Ew,b), is easily computed as max(b−w · x, 0)/||w||.
In order to choose the optimal halfspace E, we first perform a PCA analysis of the MNIST dataset and compare
this to PCA of the sphere (Figure G.6). The sphere is rotationally symmetric, so all PCA coefficients are the
same. This means that all halfspaces E of a fixed µ(E) will share the same d(E). The explained variance of
MNIST, however, is dominated by the first 100 PCA directions. This means that most halfspaces E would have
very small µ(E) and small d(E). To choose the optimalE then, we simply pickw to be the top PCA coefficient,
then choose b such that 1% of the training set is on one side of the halfspace Ew,b = {x ∈ Rn : w · x > b}.
We then use the test set to estimate µ(E) and d(E) for this set, and observe that µ(E) = .01 and d(E) = 6.59.
We visualize this set in Figure G.6 and compare it to a halfspace which is aligned with a low variance PCA
direction.
The existence of this set shows that there is room to improve adversarial robustness without reducing test error.
For example, a standard convolutional network we trained satisfies µ(E) = .007 and d(E) = 1.3. The network
reported in [5] empirically estimated µ(E) = .014 and d(E) = 5.0 (d(E) here is in the l2 metric). Note that
calculating the true d(E) is quite difficult, so we expect the true d(E) of this model to be somewhat smaller.
Nonetheless, external attempts to falsify the claims made in this paper have so far failed, so it is reasonable to
believe that this model did in fact increase d(E) somewhat. Errors still exist, however, local to most data points
[20].
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